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Abstract
This paper shows in a symmetric tax competition model that a formula
apportionment system can attain the first best welfare optimum without any
political pre-agreed harmonization or coordination of tax bases and tax rates.
The same result cannot be obtained under separating accounting even if coun-
tries agree on both tax rates and bases. The eﬃciency of company tax reform
therefore requires more political cohesion under separate accounting than for-
mula apportionment and yields lower welfare.
JEL classification: H7, H73
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1 Introduction
The recent EU commission report on company taxation aims at leveling the playing
field for company taxation in Europe by proposing four diﬀerent blueprints for a
single tax base for European multinationals. These blueprints eliminate the current
system of separate accounting whereby profits of aﬃliates of multinationals are de-
termined on the basis of the arm’s length principle as a corporate tax standard for
the EU, and instead advocates the use of a formula apportionment rule. The basic
idea underpinning each of the four proposals is that European multinationals should
be able to calculate profits originating within the EU under a consolidated tax base.
Hence, the total profit of a multinational originating within the EU should be al-
located to EU countries based on activity weights that reflect the multinational’s
relative activity in each of the EU countries.
The main argument in the literature in favor of using formula apportionment is
that it is better suited at curbing profit shifting by multinationals.1 This comes at
a cost, however, since any formula apportionment rule has the inherent structure
that shifting of profit does not occur through the pricing of inter-firm transactions,
but rather through the allocation of activity to low tax jurisdictions. Thus, the
choice between separate accounting and formula apportionment is one where one
has to trade oﬀ the diﬀerent distortions under each system.2 Perhaps as a response
to this insight, the political discussion on company tax reform in the EU has lately
concentrated its eﬀorts on the creation of a level playing field for corporate taxation
by harmonizing or approximating tax bases.3 The implicit signal is that tax rates
may be allowed to diﬀer across countries, and that the issue of tax rate harmonization
is a second step in the political process.
In the discussion of harmonization of tax bases, the emphasis has been on the
activity weights under formula apportionment and how they should be constructed
to display activities, minimize distortive taxation, and secure a fair share of revenue
1See e.g. Musgrave (1973), Bird and Brean (1986), Shakelford and Slemrod (1998) and more
recently Kind, Midelfart and Schjelderup (2004).
2The possible distortions under formula apportionment are discussed in Gordon and Wilson
(1986).
3See Devereux (2004) for a summary of the recent EU Commission report and Sørensen (2004)
for a discussion on coordination of company taxation in Europe
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for each country that has some multinational activity.4 In doing so there has been
a tendency to forget that one of the main problems in company taxation no matter
what system, is the fact that one has to determine what taxable profit is and its
relationship to the true economic profit of the firm. Any diﬀerence between what
the firm sees as true costs or revenues, in comparison to taxable costs and revenues,
creates a tax distortion that aﬀects the allocation of profit even before profit is
distributed by weights under formula apportionment.
The issue of tax neutrality under separate accounting has been examined both
in a closed and open economy setting (see e.g. Sinn 1987), whereas the simultaneous
choice of tax rate and tax base under separate accounting in a setting with multina-
tionals and competition among countries to attract shifty profit has been studied by
Haufler and Schjelderup (2000). They find that tax competition leads to a second
best equilibrium where tax deductions are incomplete and thus distortive. A compa-
rable analysis to Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) under formula apportionment has
yet to be done, and the purpose of this paper is to do just that.
This paper sets up a model with multinationals and profit shifting were firm be-
havior has the potential of being distorted by tax deductible depreciation allowances,
and where each country must decide on the optimal tax rate, tax base and appor-
tionment weight. We then compare separate accounting to formula apportionment
and find that formula apportionment has some qualities that so far has been ne-
glected in the literature. In particular, formula apportionment can reproduce the
famous Schanz-Haig-Simons tax in the sense that the tax does not aﬀect the mar-
ginal investment decisions of the firm. This is a first best property that cannot be
achieved under separate accounting.5 The implication is that a European leveling of
the playing field can be agreed upon without political coordination under formula
apportionment whilst political coordination and bargaining must be the outcome
under separate accounting. Furthermore, the outcome of such a process can only
reproduce a second best result due to the problem of profit shifting.
4McLure (1980) shows that the use of activity weights implies that local corporate income taxes
become taxes or subsidies to the factors entering the formula.
5See Johansson (1969), Samuelson (1964), and Sinn (1987, p. 119).
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2 The model
We consider a model of two small countries each of which hosts a multinational en-
terprise (MNE). The multinationals are identical in structure and each has access to
a market for internationally mobile capital and produces an output good using cap-
ital as an input. Subscripts denote the country where the MNE has its headquarter
and superscripts the country where the economic activity takes place. The output
of MNEi in country i and j is accordingly given by the production functions f ii (k
i
i)
and f ji (sik
j
i ), where si is an essential service the headquarter delivers to the aﬃliate
located in country j, which is proportional to the amount of capital invested in the
firm, and has the property of enhancing the productivity of the aﬃliate.6 The true
cost of this service is pi and it can be interpreted as the selling or lease of a patent or
knowledge. We assume throughout the analysis that pi is not observable for the tax
authorities and that the multinational may choose to overinvoice or underinvoice the
service and declare unit costs of the service equal to γi in order to reduce the total
tax payments of the corporation. It is costly to make a false statement about the
true cost of the service provided and we denote the concealment cost that each firm
incurs as Ci(|γi − pi|). The cost is assumed to be a convex function with a minimum
at Ci(0) = 0, and may be interpreted as the hiring of lawyers and accountants to
hide the true nature of the transaction.
The rate of true economic depreciation is δi, and r is the cost per unit of capital.
Before tax profits of MNEi are
πii = f ii (kii)− (r + δi)kii + [γi − pi − Ci(·)] sikji ,
πji = f
j
i (sik
j
i )− (r + δi)k
j
i − γisik
j
i ,
where [γi − pi − Ci(·)] is the net value of the transfer pricing transaction by the
parent firm.
Each multinational can deduct a share αi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2 of its capital costs and
true depreciation from the tax base. Taxable profits are
πTii = f ii (kii)− αii(r + δi)kii + [γi − pi − Ci(·)] sikji
πTji = f
j
i (sik
j
i )− α
j
i (r + δi)kii − γisik
j
i .
6This has been documented as an important mode of profit shifting (see e.g., Grubert, 2003).
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In what follows we will use this framework to analyze the properties of formula
apportionment and separate accounting. We start by examining formula apportion-
ment
2.1 Formula Apportionment
Under formula apportionment the income of the parent firm and its aﬃliate is com-
bined into a single measure of global corporate income, which is then apportioned
to each of the two countries based on some relative activity weight. In our model
we use capital as a weight of activity, and the average tax rate on profits of MNEi
then becomes
Ti = t
i
i
kii
kii + k
j
i
+ tji
kji
kii + k
j
i
, (1)
where tii ∈ [0, 1] and αi ∈ [0, 1] are choice variables of country i, whilst α
j
i ∈ [0, 1],
and tji ∈ [0, 1] are choice variables of country j. Using the above equations total
after tax profit of MNEi is
Πi = (πii + π
j
i )− Ti
³
πTii + π
Tj
i
´
. (2)
MNEi maximizes Πi with respect to γi, kii, and k
j
i . The first-order conditions are
kji si(1− Ti)C 0i = 0 (3a)
f i0i − r − δi − k
j
i (t
i
i − t
j
i )
πTii + π
Tj
i
(kii + k
j
i )
2
+ Ti(αii(r + δi)− f i0i ) = 0 (3b)
sif
j0
i − r − δi − pisi + kii(tii − t
j
i )
πTii + π
Tj
i
(kii + k
j
i )
2
+ Ti(pisi + αji (r + δi)− sif
j0
i ) = 0 (3c)
Inspection of (3a) shows that C 0i = 0 in the firm optimum, so γi = pi and there is no
transfer pricing under formula apportionment. This result confirms the conventional
wisdom pointed out and shown in several papers that under formula apportionment
firms have no incentive to manipulate profit.7 Using the envelope theorem on (2) we
get:
∂Πi
∂tii
= − k
i
i
kii + k
j
i
³
πTii + π
Tj
i
´
,
∂Πi
∂tji
= − k
j
i
kii + k
j
i
³
πTii + π
Tj
i
´
. (4)
7See e.g. Mintz (1999). This result, however, does not hold under imperfect competition as
shown by Nielsen, S.B., P.Raimondos-Møller, and G. Schjelderup (2001a).
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Diﬀerentiating (3) and then imposing symmetry tii = t
j
i , αii = α
j
i we get"
(1− Ti)f i00i 0
0 (1− Ti)s2i f
j00
i
#"
dkii
dkji
#
=
⎡
⎣
kii(1−αii)(r+δi)
(1−Ti)(kii+k
j
i )
kji (1−αii)(r+δi)
(1−Ti)(kii+k
j
i )
Ti(r + δi) 0
kii(1−αii)(r+δi)
(1−Ti)(kii+k
j
i )
kji (1−αii)(r+δi)
(1−Ti)(kii+k
j
i )
0 Ti(r + δi)
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dtii
dtji
dαii
dαji
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(5)
which allows us to derive the relevant responses of tax policy on kii and k
j
i .
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Welfare maximization. Preferences of the representative household in coun-
try i are given by the utility function Ui(ci), where the consumption level ci is
determined by the budget constraint ci = rSi +
kii
kii+k
j
i
Πi +
kij
kjj+k
i
j
Πj. Here, Si is the
capital that the household invests on the international capital market. We take this
as exogenous, but this has no consequence for our results as will be clear later. Resi-
dents in country i own a share kii/(k
i
i + k
j
i ) of the capital used by MNEi and a share
kij/(k
j
j + k
i
j) used by MNEj. In a later section we discuss the implications of relaxing
this symmetry assumption.
Inserting the individual budget constraint into the direct utility function gives
indirect utility vi(tii, t
j
i , t
i
j, t
j
i ,αii,α
j
i ,αij,α
j
j, r). For the main analysis, we assume that
the objective of each country is to maximize this utility of residents subject to a
public budget requirement. We consider a pre determined political equilibrium where
the two countries do not cooperate over tax rates nor tax bases. It is clear from
the political discussions surrounding EU company tax reform that there might be
political will to harmonize or at least coordinate tax bases, but no commitment has
been given by any country to such a strategy. It is therefore of interest to characterize
the case when no restrictions apply to each country’s choice of tax rate and base.
Initially, we assume that countries can agree to the apportionment weights, but this
assumption will be relaxed later.9
The objective of country i is to choose tii, t
i
j,αii and α
j
i to maximize indirect utility
vi(·) subject to an exogenous revenue requirement Ri. We do not model explicitly
8A similar matrix can easily be derived for MNEj to obtain the changes in kjj , k
i
j that result
from a change in tjj , t
i
j ,αii,α
j
i
9The choice of weights do not seem to be a political issue within the EU, rather it is the choice
among alternative formula apportionment schemes that is politicized, see Sørensen (2004).
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why there is such a revenue requirement but the underlying assumption may be
that there for political and redistributive reasons must be a certain amount of tax
revenue collected from the corporate sector.
Using (4) the Lagrangian to the optimization problem is:
Li(·) = vi(·) + λi
µ
−tii
∂Πi
∂tii
− tij
∂Πj
∂tij
−Ri
¶
.
Using the envelope theorem on the indirect utility function where µi is the marginal
utility of income, the first-order conditions for tii and t
i
j are:
(µi − λi)
∂Πi
∂tii
+ λitii(1− αii)
r + δi
1− Ti
kii
kii + k
j
i
Ã
∂kii
∂tii
+
∂kji
∂tii
!
= 0, (6a)
(µi − λi)
∂Πj
∂tij
+ λitij(1− αij)
r + δj
1− Tj
kij
kjj + k
i
j
Ã
∂kjj
∂tij
+
∂kij
∂tij
!
= 0. (6b)
Inspection of (5) shows that ∂kii/∂tii+∂k
j
i /∂tii 6= 0 ∀ αii 6= 1 and zero otherwise. Sim-
ilarly, the term
¡
∂kjj/∂tij + ∂kij/∂tij
¢
vanishes at αij = 1, but is non-zero otherwise.
In (5) the second terms in both first-order conditions are multiplied with a factor
(1− α) where sub/superscripts have been supressed, which is determined by the
depreciation allowance given toMNCi andMNCj. If αii = 1 = αij, inspection of (6)
shows that the second term in both conditions vanishes and both first-order condi-
tions imply µi = λi. Hence, marginal utility of income equals the shadow price of
public revenues. The implication of this is that we have a first-best welfare optimum
if we can show that αii = 1 = αij is also compatible with the first-order conditions
for αii and αij. From (5) we know that ∂k
j
i /∂αii = 0. Similarly, ∂k
j
j/∂αij = 0. Using
this information, the first order conditions for αii and αij are:
(λi − µi)tii(r + δi)kii
kii
kii + k
j
i
+ λitii(1− αii)
r + δi
1− Ti
kii
kii + k
j
i
∂kii
∂αii
= 0 (7a)
(λi − µi)tij(r + δj)kij
kij
kjj + k
i
j
+ λitij(1− αij)
r + δj
1− Tj
kij
kjj + k
i
j
∂kij
∂αij
= 0 (7b)
It is seen from (5) that ∂kii/∂αii 6= 0 ∀ Ti ∈ (0, 1), and ∂kii/∂αii 6= 0 ∀ Tj ∈ (0, 1).
We can then conclude that αii = αij = 1 is a solution to the maximization problem.
From the derivations above it follows that when foreign direct investments are in-
troduced and multinationals can shift profit through transfer pricing, it is optimal for
each country not to distort the investment decisions of multinationals. Since under
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formula apportionment, the multinational cannot save tax payments by manipulat-
ing profit income in a single country, distorting investment behavior has no eﬀect
on the incentive to shift profit and would only serve to reduce the overall amount
of profit to be shared. Thus, in a symmetric country setting a formula apportion-
ment tax is a tax on pure profit and reproduces the well known Schanz-Haig-Simons
property derived in a closed economy setting. In order to see this, note that un-
der symmetry assumptions and with full deductions, the apportionment weights are
identical in each country and the average tax rate is Ti = ti(= tj) from (1). One can
then rewrite the firm’s first order conditions in (3) as
kji si(1− ti)C 0i = 0,
(1− ti)
£
f i0i − r − δi
¤
= 0, (7c)
(1− ti)
£
sif
j0
i − r − δi − pisi
¤
= 0,
where it is seen that the tax rate can be factored away and the firm’s decisions
are unaﬀected by taxation. The implication of the neutrality result is that each
country in the Nash equilibrium provides complete deductions αii = αij = 1, and no
coordination among countries is needed neither on the tax base nor on the tax rate
to achieve the first best welfare optimum.
In the analysis above we assumed that the apportionment weights were not choice
variables. The analysis was also conducted with only one factor of production namely
capital. Relaxing these assumptions we obtain;
PROPOSITION 1: In a non-cooperative tax equilibrium where each country
maximizes welfare by choosing its tax rate, tax base and weight to apportion profit,
and each firm employs two factors (labor and capital), the symmetric Nash equilib-
rium yields a first best outcome, with true costs equal to tax deductible costs.
PROOF: See http://www.nhh.no/sam/res-publ/supplements/appitax.pdf
Introducing apportionment weights as a choice variable to each country and
allowing firms to employ several factors of production do not change the incentive
of countries to allow depreciation allowances to equal true depreciation costs, since
these additions to the model do not aﬀect the definition of taxable profit.
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2.2 Separate Accounting
How does the above results compare to what one would find under separate account-
ing? An answer to this question is given by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), who
shows that the problem of profit shifting under separate accounting does not lead
to a first best outcome, and that in the Nash equilibrium, countries use incomplete
deductions (in our setting 0 < αii = αij < 1) in order to tax the profit of the multina-
tionals.10 The intuition is that the tax rate and the tax base are equally eﬀective tax
instruments to tax multinationals. Thus, if profit shifting is triggered by diﬀerences
in statutory tax rates (as suggested by the empirical literature, see Hines 1999), then
the tax elasticity of the tax base is lowered by incomplete deductions. This comes
as a cost, though, since it means that the tax at the margin distorts firm behavior
and a first best solution can therefore not be obtained. The problem, of course, is
that the delineation of the tax base by arm’s length prices give rise to profit shifting
that can only partially be cured by the use of two tax instruments simultaneously.
3 Concluding remarks
Our analysis above have made several simplifying assumptions and we would like
to relax in order to assess the robustness of our results. A first important feature
of the analysis is that the two countries jointly own with equal shares the two
multinationals. It is of course possible to perceive other ownership structures. One
such structure would be to either let each country have an ownership share equal to
(1− θ) in both firms, or alternatively, to let each countries have a diﬀerent ownership
share in either firm. It is not clear to us if this would retain the presumption in favor
of formula apportionment. A clue to this might be found in Nielsen, Raimondos-
Møller and Schjelderup (2001b) who model profit shifting and tax competition, but
without a choice variable for the tax base. They allow a share θ of the multinationals
to be owned by residents in country i and the residual (1− θ) by residents in country
j. In their welfare analysis they find that a switch from separate accounting to
10The paper by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) is obtained in a framework where one firm exports
a good to the other firms. It is at least in theory possible that their results do not carry over in our
framework. However, we shown in the Appendix that using the model above replicates the findings
in Haufler and Schjelderup (2000).
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formula apportionment may reduce welfare depending on how costly it is to shift
profit and the level of profit the multinationals generate.
A third possibility would be to let both multinationals be owned by residents of
a third country.11 This case has been examined by Kind, Midelfart and Schjelderup
(2004) in a setting with trade and barriers to trade, but where, again, there is no
choice of profit base. They find that under separate accounting the transfer price is
relatively tax sensitive for a high degree of economic integration. In contrast, under
a formula apportionment the transfer price is not very tax sensitive for high levels of
economic integration. Thus if economic integration and shifty profits are a concern
to policymakers, their message is that for a high degree of economic integration,
tax competition intensifies under separate accounting while the opposite is the case
under formula apportionment. These findings are mirrored in their welfare analysis
which show that for a low (high) level of economic integration a system of separate
accounting (formula apportionment) is welfare dominating.
4 Appendix
In this appendix we show the outcome of the tax competition game under separate
accounting.
Firm behavior. Under separate accounting the total net profits of MNEi are
Πi = (πii + π
j
i )− tiiπTii − t
j
iπ
Tj
i
where tii ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of the corporation tax on MNEi in country i and t
j
i ∈ [0, 1]
is the corporation tax on MNEi in country j. MNEi maximizes Πi, and the first order
conditions for chooses γi, kii, and k
j
i , respectively are
kji si(t
j
i − tii)− (1− tii)C 0i ≤ 0
(1− tii)f ii (kii)− (1− tiiαii)(r + δi) = 0 (8a)
si(γi(t
j
i − tii)− (pi + Ci)(1− tii) + (1− t
j
i )f
j0
i )− (1− α
j
i t
j
i )(r + δi) = 0
The first line in (8a) shows that there will be no transfer pricing if tii = t
j
i →
C 0i = 0 or C
0
i(γi = pi) 6= 0, i.e., concealment costs are prohibitive (C 00i > 0). To
11In which case our maximization problem disappears.
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concentrate on interior solutions we assume that concealment costs are such that
the latter will never be the case. Given this, the first line holds with strict equality.
The second and the third line have the usual interpretations of equating marginal
revenues to marginal costs.
Using the envelope theorem on (8a) yields
∂Πi
∂tii
= −πTii
∂Πi
∂tji
= −πTij
We diﬀerentiate (8a) and then impose symmetry assumptions tii = t
j
i ,αii = α
j
i to
obtain
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(1− tii)f i00i 0 0
0 (1− tii)s2i f
j00
i 0
0 0 −kji siC 00i
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
dkii
dkji
dγi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(1− αii) r+δi1−tii 0 t
i
i(r + δi) 0
si(γi − Ci − pi) θ 0 −tii(r + δii)
kji si −k
j
i si 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dtii
dtji
dαii
dαji
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(9)
where θ = si(Ci + pi − γi)(r + δi)
1−αii
1−tii
. Using Cramer’s rule we can now get the
changes in kii, k
j
i , γi following changes in the policy instruments tii, t
j
i , αii, α
j
i for a
given concealment costs function. A similar matrix can easily be derived forMNEj
to obtain the changes in kjj , k
i
j, and γj that follows when t
j
j, t
i
j, αii, and α
j
i changes.
Maximizing welfare. The objective of country i is to choose tii, tij,αii and α
j
i
to maximize indirect utility vi(·) subject to a budget constraint which amounts to
raising an amount taxes Ri. From the first order conditions of the firm the associated
Lagrangian is:
Li(·) := vi(·) + λi
µ
−tii
∂Πi
∂tii
− tij
∂Πj
∂tij
−Ri
¶
We define µi the marginal utility of income. Using the envelope theorem on the
indirect utility function, the first-order conditions for and ti and tij respectively are:
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(µi − λi)
∂Πi
∂tii
+ λi
Ã
(1− αii)
r + δi
1− tii
∂kii
∂tii
− si(Ci + pi − γi)
∂kji
∂tii
+ kji si
∂γi
∂tii
!
= 0
(10a)
(µi − λi)
∂Πj
∂tij
+ λi
Ã
(1− αij)
r + δj
1− tij
∂kij
∂tij
− sj(Cj + pj − γj)
∂kjj
∂tij
+ kjjsj
∂γj
∂tij
!
= 0
(10b)
Using (9) in (10) it is straightforward to see that the coeﬃcient of the Lagrangian
parameter in (10) is negative for all αii,α
j
i ∈ [0, 1] and all tii, t
j
i ∈ [0, 1) and therefore
µi 6= λi. It then becomes immaterial to check the first-order conditions for the
depreciation allowance in order to verify that the first-best cannot be obtained under
separate accounting.¥
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